SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cases of
interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope to assist the legal
community in keeping abreast of some of the more interestingchanges in
significant areas of Third Circuit practice.
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JUDGE-Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1993).
In September 1985, plaintiff Lois Grant filed a Social Security
Insurance disability benefits application. 989 F.2d at 1333. Plaintiff alleged she could not engage in any substantial gainful employment due to complications arising from a knee injury. This claim
was denied, and plaintiff subsequently requested a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ). Id. at 1333-34. Affirming the
denial of Social Security Insurance disability benefits to plaintiff,
the ALJ, Russel Rowell (ALJ Rowell), found Ms. Grant's claims of
pain not credible mainly because Grant could perform sedentary
work. Id. at 1334. The ALJ also found persuasive the fact that if
successful, plaintiff would receive "secondary gain" resulting in a
higher income for plaintiff than her pre-injury income. After the
Health and Human Services Appeals Panel denied plaintiff's application for review, Grant filed a complaint, pursuant to § 205(g) of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5 (g) (1988), in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id.
Grant's complaint, filed against the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (Secretary), alleged that ALJ Rowell was biased
against plaintiff and all claimants. Id. Grant later amended her
complaint to include a class of plaintiffs whose cases had been or
would be heard by ALJ Rowell, and the district court subsequently
certified that class with certain temporal restrictions. Id. at 1334-35
(quoting Grant v. Sullivan, 131 F.R.D. 436, 450 (M.D. Pa. 1990)).
Among the relief sought was a declaratory judgment stating that
ALJ Rowell's bias had acted to deprive claimants of a fair hearing.
Id.
The Chair of the Social Security Administration Appeals
Council, in the interim, had appointed a panel to sample randomly
cases decided by ALJ Rowell to determine any bias on the judge's
part. Id. at 1335. Plaintiffs and ALJ Rowell were permitted to testify, examine witnesses, and introduce evidence before the panel.
Id. The district court rejected a motion by the Secretary to either
dismiss the case or stay the matter pending the determination of
the panel, stating that the plaintiffs should not be required to exhaust all of their administrative remedies before a full trial in the
district court. Id. After completing the investigation, the panel issued a report which found that no evidence existed to substantiate
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the claim that ALJ Rowell was biased. Id. at 1336. The panel's only
criticism of the ALJ was the judge's use of "irregular language" in
his decisions. Id. After considering the panel's findings as well as
depositions from former coworkers, the acting Chair of the Appeals Council accepted the panel's conclusions. Id. Subsequently,
the Secretary moved to have the district court review the administrative record. Id. at 1337. An interlocutory appeal was certified to
determine whether the district court could hold a trial and make
its own findings of fact on plaintiffs' bias claims. Id.
On appeal, the Secretary maintained that the Social Security
Act precluded a district court from adopting a fact-finding role,
even in a class action. Id. (citation omitted). Relying on two
Supreme Court decisions, plaintiffs maintained that there was sufficient evidence of ALJ Rowell's bias, such as testimony from an individual about conversations with the judge and the judge's alleged
destruction of certain hearing notes. Id. (citing Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S.
467 (1986)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the district court must review the Secretary's findings on ALJ Rowell's alleged bias but may not make independent
findings of fact on that issue. Id. at 1346.
Judge Alito, writing for the court, began by discussing pertinent sections of the Social Security Act and circuit precedent governing the review process in Social Security cases. Id. at 1337-38.
The Third Circuit pointed out that § 205 (g) explicitly provides that
the Secretary's findings of fact are conclusive. Id. at 1338. The
court explained that the district court must remand the matter to
the Secretary if new findings are necessary. Id.
Even in cases of alleged bias exhibited by an ALJ, the panel
stated, no fact-finding power is bestowed on the district court in
Social Security cases. Id. (citing Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91, 93
(3d Cir. 1984)). Upon reaching that conclusion, the Third Circuit
proceeded to explain that although Hummel and § 205 (g) refer to
an individual claimant when outlining the review process, plaintiffs' contention that the district court should adopt a fact-finding
role in class actions was without merit and distinction. Id. at 1339.
The panel supported its reasoning by examining Supreme
Court decisions upon which the plaintiffs and the dissent relied.
Id. The court agreed that class relief was available under § 20 5 (g)
because there was no contrary congressional intent. Id. at 1339-40
(citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979)). The Third
Circuit, however, disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the
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restrictive singular language in § 205(g) should be interpreted literally and that the district court, in a class action, should be allowed to transgress the Secretary's findings. Id. at 1340. Likewise,
the panel rejected the dissent's reasoning that § 205(g) is only applicable to individual review cases, noting that the Yamasaki Court
had rejected similar reasoning. Id. at 1340-41.
Judge Alito next rejected plaintiffs' argument that a previous
Supreme Court case had allowed district court fact-finding in a Social Security case. Id. at 1341 (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476
U.S. 467 (1986)). The Third Circuit agreed that the district court
in that matter made findings of fact regarding a secret and illegal
policy adopted by the Social Security Administration. Id. Citing a
plethora of cases in support, however, the majority posited that this
was not enough to establish precedent because the fact-finding was
never ruled upon or challenged on appeal. Id. (citations omitted).
The court opined that in the instant matter, the Secretary
could easily act as an impartial fact finder regarding ALJ Rowell's
alleged bias. Id. at 1342. The court explained that, unlike City of
New York, there was no secret and illegal agency policy that would
preclude the Secretary from being an impartial fact finder. Id.
This, together with certain jurisdictional differences, the Third Circuit maintained, distinguished the factual underpinnings of the
two matters. Id.
Judge Alito next refuted one of the dissent's arguments by explaining that the decision on which the dissenting judge relied involved a different statute and a different question. Id. (citing
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 489 U.S. 499 (1991)). The
court further explained that the plaintiffs in the instant matter had
the ability to obtain judicial review of the Secretary's decision regarding ALJ Rowell's alleged bias, whereas the plaintiffs in McNary
had no such avenue. Id. at 1342-43. The Third Circuit went on to
distinguish on similar grounds several of its own decisions on
which plaintiffs relied. Id. at 1343-44.
The court explained in some detail that its decision was consistent with the goals of the administrative process and the independence of administrative law judges in making their decisions free
from exterior pressures. Id. at 1344. The court further opined that
extensive discovery, such as that sought by the plaintiffs and contemplated by the district court herein, would be an anathema to
the administrative process. Id. Judge Alito noted that the discovery sought by the plaintiffs would subject ALJ Rowell to intense
scrutiny-the type of scrutiny which the Supreme Court had
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frowned upon, both in the judicial and administrative arenas. Id.
(citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)). The
Third Circuit maintained that such discovery, if allowed, would
cause wariness within the ranks of the administrative law judges
and would interfere with their ability to decide matters based solely
on the law and evidence. Id. at 1345.
The court recognized that bias in the administrative process
should be avoided. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)). The court,
however, pointed out that there are sufficient measures already in
place, both regulatory and statutory, to preclude bias or partiality.
Id. at 1346.
The panel, in conclusion, reiterated that the findings of the
special panel appointed by the Appeals Council are open to review
by the district court, which could, additionally, remand the matter
to the Secretary for further findings. Id. The Third Circuit maintained that this would protect the plaintiffs' rights to an impartial
administrative determination. Id. Therefore, the court held that
the district court could not engage in fact-finding but, instead,
could only review the Secretary's findings on ALJ Rowell's alleged
bias. Id.
In a well-structured and exhaustive dissent, Judge Higginbotham split the majority's decision into four grounds and refuted
each. Id. at 1347 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The judge first
posited that class actions generally involve a challenge of an agency
policy or practice, not an individual review of each plaintiff's entitlement to benefits. Id. at 1347-48 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
After highlighting the "singular" language in § 205(g), Judge Higginbotham discussed at length the reasons why that section applies
only to individuals seeking a review of an adverse determination.
Id. at 1348-49 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Thus, the judge concluded that § 205(g) was inapplicable in class actions by Social Security claimants. Id. at 1349-50 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
Judge Higginbotham next recited that the Hummel court only
precluded a district court's fact-finding role in cases involving a review of a Social Security decision. Id. at 1351 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting). The judge criticized the majority's examination of
Hummel and stated that the Hummel court did not hold, as the majority maintained, that a district court may never make findings regarding an administrative law judge's alleged bias. Id. at 1352
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Contrary to the majority decision,
Judge Higginbotham maintained that Hummel did not address situ-
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ations of class-wide challenges. Id. at 1352-53 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Higginbotham next disagreed with the majority's distinction between the partiality of the Secretary in the context of a
secret and illegal agency policy versus the review of an administrative lawjudge's alleged bias. Id. at 1353 (Higginbotham,J., dissenting). In support, Judge Higginbotham reasoned that the ALJ, the
Secretary, and the many branches of the agency cannot be separated so efficiently because they are all contained within the same
bureaucracy. Id.
In his final criticism of the majority's decision, the judge refuted the alleged deleterious effect that fact-finding would have on
the administrative process. Id. at 1354 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham distinguished administrative lawjudges
from federal judges and maintained that ALJs are not provided the
same independence given to federaljudges. Id. The judge further
maintained that the Social Security Administration lacks the expertise to establish a complete administrative record of alleged bias,
something to which plaintiffs are entitled. Id. at 1354-55 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The judge posited that the ability of a district court to make findings regarding alleged bias in an
administrative proceeding would embolden public confidence concerning the administrative processes. Id. at 1355 (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting).
Judge Higginbotham, after discussing the facts of Bowen, maintained that there are two factors to be utilized when adjudicating a
district court's authority to exercise a de novo or restricted review
of agency fact-finding. Id. at 1355-57 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The judge, employing the reasoning of Bowen, maintained
that if a collateral challenge to a claim of entitlement is brought
and an administrative hearing will not provide full relief, a district
court may undertake a fact-finding review. Id. at 1357 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
Judge Higginbotham then proffered that the two criteria were
satisfied in the case at bar. Id. More particularly, the judge explained that because the agency affords an inadequate review procedure in cases such as this, the plaintiffs were unlikely to receive
full relief. Id.
After reiterating that the plaintiffs alleged a due process violation because of ALJ Rowell's bias, Judge Higginbotham compared
the case at bar to a recent United States Supreme Court opinion.
Id. at 1357-58 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing McNaiy v. Hai-
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tian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 499 (1991)). The judge concluded that McNary supported the proposition that limited review
by a district court is inapplicable in class actions. Id. at 1359 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
In concluding, Judge Higginbotham scolded the majority for
placing the courts in an inferior position to bureaucratic agencies.
Id. The judge maintained that this radical departure in the relationship between federal agencies and the federal courts was most
unwise and would have far-reaching negative consequences. Id.
While it would be a Nirvana if agency heads looked impartially
on all decisions rendered by their administrative lawjudges, such is
likely not the case. The federal administrative law system has long
been criticized for its appearance of impropriety, most often because federal administrative law judges are located in the same
building as the agency for which they work and often fraternize
with agency heads and agency personnel. New Jersey's administrative law system, along with a number of others, was made a separate
agency in response to similar criticisms. It is also notable that
United States Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama has recently introduced federal legislation that would make the federal system an
autonomous agency. The judiciary committees in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate have reported favorably on the
bill.
Additionally, administrative law judges are not, as Judge Higginbotham correctly observed, federal judges. Administrative law
judges are part of the executive branch, not the judiciary, and consequently are not afforded the same protection from scrutiny as
members of the judiciary. When, as in the Grant case, a substantial
pattern of biased behavior begins to emerge from administrative
hearings, district court fact-finding should be mandated. The majority's decision, while liberally sprinkled with syllogisms concerning the protection of the administrative process, fails to take notice
of the festering undercurrent of favoritism in the administrative
law system and the already tarnished public perception of administrative practices.
Admittedly, it would be difficult to define just what would constitute a substantial pattern of bias warranting de novo review by
the district court. Is it ten cases... fifty... one hundred? A caseby-case examination may seem a panacea, but incongruous results
are quite likely. Yet, this would be more preferable than the impermeable barrier erected by the Third Circuit to district court factfinding. Although Judge Higginbotham's dissent utilizes disputa-
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ble premises, his conclusion appears to be more reasonable than
the one reached by the majority. The majority's decision acts as a
prophylactic for the administrative tribunal procedure. Where it
becomes evident that a pattern of wrongdoing may exist, however,
the district court should be allowed to pierce the "administrative
veil" and examine the tribunal's records.
Louis A. Chiafullo
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OR THE EFFECT OF IMPAIRING THEIR ABILITY TO OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN MORE THAN ONE STATE-

United Wire, Metal and

Mach. Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown MemorialHosp., 995
F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
In 1971, New Jersey enacted the Health Care Facilities Planning Act which predetermined hospital rates. 995 F.2d at 1189.
NewJersey amended this act in 1978 when it enacted Chapter 83 of

the Health Care Cost Reduction Act (Chapter 83 or Act). A
number of self-insured union employee welfare benefit plans
(plans), which qualified under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 et seq. (ERISA), brought an action
seeking to enjoin the application of Chapter 83 and further seeking restitution for monies paid under protest pursuant to the Act.
Id. at 1188. The plans argued that Chapter 83 worked an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation and that
Chapter 83 was invalid as it was violative of ERISA's preemption
clause.
At the heart of the plans' claims were certain components of a
patient's hospital bill as prescribed by Chapter 83. Id. at 1189.
Under Chapter 83, medical procedures are divided into "diagnostic related groups" (DRG's), and a predetermined rate is assigned
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to each DRG. While the plans did not dispute the validity of base
rates assigned to DRG's under Chapter 83, they challenged certain
other costs that were added to hospital bills in order to make up
for the lost cost of "uncompensated care" given to indigents, and
the difference between the Medicare rate of payment and the DRG
rate, as Medicare provides reimbursement at levels below the DRG
rates. The plans also disputed provisions in Chapter 83 which
granted discounts to certain classes of payors who are members of
"health insurance coverages which are not self supporting." ERISA plans are deemed to be self-supporting, and plan members
were thus not entitled to receive discounts; consequently, plans
were billed at an increased rate to recover the income lost to those
who qualified for discounts. Id. at 1189-90.
The plans' final contention against Chapter 83 was that any
third party payor (commercial insurance company, self funded
union, etc.) was denied the right to appeal a hospital bill that was
excessive, while the right was granted to all other patients. As third
party payors falling into the self-funded union category, ERISA
plans were forbidden to appeal their bills no matter how excessive.
The federal district court refused to reach the question of restitution and entered summary judgment for New Jersey on the
plans' unconstitutional taking claims. Id. at 1189. The district
court entered summary judgment for the plans regarding their ERISA preemption claim, enjoining the enforcement of the Act as applied to the plans and staying the injunction pending appeal. Id. at
1188-89.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that Chapter 83 was neither preempted by ERISA nor
unconstitutional. Id. at 1196. In reversing the district court, the
Third Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case with
instructions to enter judgment for the defendants. Id.
Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Stapleton first addressed
whether the case was moot as Chapter 83 was superseded by new
state legislation on January 1, 1993. Id. at 1190. Judge Stapleton
determined that the case was not moot because, notwithstanding
the now moot injunction sought by the plans, the plans also sought
restitution of monies paid under protest pursuant to Chapter 83
while it was effective. Id. The judge noted that the plans' restitution claim would remain viable if, in fact, Chapter 83 was found to
be infirm. Id. Observing that the merits of the restitution claim
could only be addressed after a determination of whether the monies were paid pursuant to an unlawful statutory scheme, Judge Sta-
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pleton turned the attention of the court to an evaluation of
Chapter 83's lawfulness. Id.
Regarding the plans' constitutional claims, the court noted
the three-part test used to determine if property has been taken
unconstitutionally without just compensation. Id. at 1190 (quoting
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)). The three factors a court must consider, Judge Stapleton
proffered, are "(i) the character of the governmental action; (ii)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and (iii)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with investment
backed expectations." Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
The court quickly disposed of all three considerations as the character of New Jersey's actions did not work any physical invasion
against plan assets, nor was there any significant economic impact
upon the plans as the amount of monies owed by the plans was not
randomly generated, but instead "directly related to the individual
[plans'] hospital bill." Id. at 1190-91 (quoting United Wire, Health &
Welfare Fund v. Morristown, 794 F. Supp. 524, 542 (D.N.J. 1992)).
Judge Stapleton finally noted that in a state with a history of pervasive and constant health care regulation such as New Jersey, the
plans could not have had any investment backed expectations. Id.
at 1191.
Having disposed of the plans' constitutional claims, the court
turned to the more difficult question of whether Chapter 83 was
preempted by ERISA. Id. Judge Stapleton observed that § 514(a)
of ERISA, which provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan," is notable for its breadth and indicates congressional intent to make pension plan regulation an entirely
federal matter. Id. (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504 (1981)).
Regarding the issue of when exactly a state law "relates to" an
ERISA governed plan, and is thus preempted, the court recognized
that the United State Supreme Court has determined that a state
statute will relate to ERISA "if it has a connection with or reference
to" ERISA, but that the effect of some state action on benefit plans
may be "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 97-100 (1983)). Ultimately, however, the
court noted, the touchstone of any preemption analysis is congressional purpose. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)).
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To determine congressional purpose behind ERISA's preemption clause, the court considered the Supreme Court's investigation of the issue in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne. Id. at 1191-92
(citing FortHalifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)). Judge
Stapleton observed that in Fort Halifax, the Supreme Court acknowledged that an employer who commits to systematic payment
of certain benefits undertakes a myriad of administrative obligations and that preemption insures that these administrative practices will be governed by a unified set of regulations. Id. at 1192
(quoting Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 9, 11). Noting that it is with the
Fort Halifax decision in mind that a court must understand the numerous ERISA preemption cases that have been decided since ERISA's adoption, Judge Stapleton considered various decisions and
concluded that a law relates to an ERISA plan if it is designed to
affect such plans, if the plans are singled out for special treatment,
or if the rights or restrictions it establishes are predicated on the
existence of an ERISA plan. Id. (citations omitted). Because Chapter 83 was a statute of general applicability designed to predetermine hospital rates, and because the statute functioned without
regard to the existence of ERISA plans and did not single out such
plans for special treatment, Judge Stapleton determined that those
decisions which found state statutes to be preempted by ERISA
were inapplicable. Id.
Judge Stapleton next declined to accept the plans' argument
that because Chapter 83 expressly referred to a "self funded union"
as an example of a "third party payor," it was referring to ERISA
plans. Id. at 1192 n.6. The court explained that the reference
could be excised from Chapter 83 without altering the effect of the
statute in any way. Id.
The court also specifically rejected the dissent's suggestion
that Chapter 83 should be preempted because, economically, the
statute could not meet its social goals without participation by ERISA plans. Id. Judge Stapleton noted that it was of no legal consequence that a statute could not meet its social goals without ERISA
plan participation. Id. Rather, the court determined, the test for
preemption "is whether the existence of ERISA plans is necessary
for the statute to be meaningfully applied." Id. (citing District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S.Ct. 580, 583-84
(1992)).
Having determined that Chapter 83 did not single out ERISA
plans for special treatment, and that the NewJersey statute was not
predicated on the existence of such plans, the court observed that
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it still had to consider whether the statute was preempted notwithstanding that it had no direct nexus with ERISA. Id. In this regard,
the court noted that the effect of the statute did not dictate or
restrict the options of ERISA plans with regard to their benefits.
Id. at 1193 (citation omitted).
The court articulated that while Chapter 83 might increase the
charges billed by hospitals to ERISA participants, the overall effect
would not differ from any state regulation that increases costs of
services to hospitals which the hospitals, in turn, pass on to patients, such as utility costs, employee wages, or waste disposal. Id.
Judge Stapleton noted that Chapter 83 in no way dictates that ERISA plans need structure their benefits or internal affairs in any
way. Id. Moreover, the court concluded, ERISA plans were not deprived of any of the normal alternatives that they would have when
structuring their plans and, as hospital prices vary depending upon
the region, a particular state's rate setting scheme would have no
detrimental effect upon interstate operation of ERISA plans. Id.
To bolster its conclusion that there was no direct nexus between the state regulation and ERISA plans, the court relied upon
Rebaldo v. Cuomo. Id. at 1193-94 (citing Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d
133 (2d Cir. 1984)). The court stated that in Rebaldo, a New York
statute that attempted to set hospital rates was upheld against a
preemption claim because the New York statute, like New Jersey's,
was a statute of general applicability and did not "affect the structure, administration or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA
plan," despite that the statute "had some economic impact on ERISA plans." Id. at 1194 (quoting Rebaldo, 749 F.2d at 138-39).
The court rejected the plans' argument that Rebaldo was not
good law and that the proper guidance for an ERISA preemption
analysis should be found in Ingersol-Rand Co. v. McClendon. Id. at
1194-95 (citing Ingersol-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478
(1990)). The court noted that in McClendon, where the Supreme
Court found that § 514(c) (2) of ERISA, which states that any law is
preempted which "purports to regulate . . . the terms and condi-

tions of employee benefit plans," did not limit § 514 preemption to
only those laws which made reference to ERISA. Id. Rather, the
court found that ERISA preempted any statute which was predicated on the existence of an employee benefit plan. Id. Judge Stapleton distinguished Ingersol-Randfrom the case subjudice, stressing
that the statute in that case was not one of general applicability as it
made specific reference to ERISA plans and predicated liability
upon the existence of such plans. Id. at 1195. Because Chapter 83
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was a statute of general applicability and because it made no reference and functioned without regard to any ERISA plan, the court
stated the Rebaldo analysis was more suited to the case at hand than
was the Ingersol-Rand analysis. Id.
Concluding, the court rejected the plans' argument that
Chapter 83 required ERISA plans to. act in a manner inconsistent
with their duty, as fiduciaries, to apply employee benefit fund assets
only to plan participants. Id. at 1194-95. The court demonstrated
that it would be impossible to require ERISA plans to scrutinize the
pricing mechanism of every health care provider to insure that hospital costs correlate directly to services rendered. Id. Instead,
Judge Stapleton opined, it is sufficient that ERISA plans pay
"whatever portion of the price charged by the health care provider
the plan has assumed." Id. at 1196.
Most importantly, the court concluded, a state, through its police powers, can regulate in a number of ways where such regulation will result in increases in the costs of conducting business and
where such costs will be paid by those other than the beneficiaries
of the regulation. Id. The court noted that New Jersey's decision
to require hospitals to treat indigents and medicare patients is an
example of an exercise of the state's police power. Id. The judge
ended his reversal of the district court by reiterating that the portion of Chapter 83 at issue was not unconstitutional or preempted
by ERSIA. Id.
Although recognizing that the decision was made difficult by
the laudatory goals of the New Jersey statute, Judge Nygaard dissented because the judge believed Chapter 83 to be the kind of
statute that congress intended to preempt. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nygaard first noted the extraordinary expansiveness of
ERISA § 514(a) and demonstrated that the term "relate to" must
be given a "broad common sense meaning." Id. at 1197 (Nygaard,
J., dissenting) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987)).
The judge next argued that ERISA plans were so important to
Chapter 83 that, were the costs of uncompensated care and discounts given to certain non-self funded insurance groups not
shifted to ERISA plans, Chapter 83 would be entirely unworkable.
Id. at 1197-98 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). As evidence of a purposeful intent on the part of the New Jersey Legislature to insure
that ERISA plans play a pivotal role in Chapter 83, Judge Nygaard
pointed to New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 26:2H18.31 (c) (2), under which hospitals are required to screen patients
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to determine if they are covered by a union welfare plan. Id. at
1198 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Indeed, the judge noted that New
Jersey itself conceded that Chapter 83 would not have been "viable" without ERISA plan participation as the plans make up such a
large segment of the bill-paying public that it would be "impossible
to devise a viable hospital rate-setting scheme if that segment [the
Plans] is excluded or exempted from the scheme." Id. (citations
omitted). Judge Nygaard reasoned that any such concession was
uncontrovertible proof that the effect of Chapter 83 was to "reach
into the pockets of ERISA funds." Id.
The judge harshly categorized the New Jersey statute as an effort by New Jersey to avoid the expenditure of its own monies by
pawning the medical costs of those who are favored at law (e.g., the
indigent, the elderly) onto the backs of deep pockets such as ERISA plan participants. Id.
Judge Nygaard rejected the majority's argument that Chapter
83's effect on ERISA was remote and tenuous, and the Judge again
pointed out references in Chapter 83 to "self funded unions" and
"union welfare plans." Id. at 1199 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). The
judge criticized the majority for taking these references lightly as,
in Judge Nygaard's mind, the references were proof that ERISA
plans were singled out for special treatment. Id. Because such a
large number of individuals who were able to pay for their hospital
services were members of ERISA plans, the judge found unconvincing the majority's argument that references to ERISA plans in
Chapter 83 "could be excised without altering the effect of the statute in any way." Id.
Judge Nygaard next argued that even if one accepts the majority's argument that the references to "union welfare plan" and "self
funded union" were not references to ERISA plans specifically,
there could be no doubt that Chapter 83 singled out ERISA plans
for special treatment as applied. Id. Here, Judge Nygaard offered
various statistics demonstrating that ERISA plans shouldered an
enormous amount of the financial burden of making up for lost
costs. Id. at 1199-1200 (Nygaard,J., dissenting). These figures, coupled with the state's concession that Chapter 83 would not be viable without participation from ERISA plans, was irrefutable proof,
in Judge Nygaard's opinion, that the Act was designed with ERISA
funds in mind and ought to be preempted by ERISA as such dependence upon plan participation surely "relates to" ERISA plans
for the purposes of § 514(a). Id.
Judge Nygaard next discussed the Ingersol-Randcase which had
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been dismissed by the majority and concluded that this opinion
was the proper authority for the case at hand. Id. at 1200 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). The judge believed that the majority should
have applied Ingersol-Rands holding that any statute which is predicated on the existence of ERISA plans and whose mandates could
not be carried out without ERISA funds should be preempted. Id.
Next, Judge Nygaard argued that Chapter 83 had the effect of
dictating or restructuring the manner in which ERISA plans structure or conduct their affairs in violation of the majority's own test
for preemption. Id. The judge analogized the case at hand to GeneralElectric Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor,489 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989),
where a New York labor law was preempted by ERISA because the
law forced contractors to adjust their wage schedule and to make
their books available for inspection. Id. The judge proffered that
Chapter 83 was analogous to the New York labor law, as Chapter 83
required ERISA plans to either pay surcharges or restructure themselves to avoid them. Id. Surely, the judge observed, because ERISA plans were forced to pay "the lion's share" of hospital costs
under Chapter 83, it would be reasonable to assume that they
would attempt to make changes to avoid such costs. Id. at 1198,
1200 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
Judge Nygaard next attacked the majority for its reliance on
Rebaldo v. Cuomo. Id. at 1200 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Judge Nygaard stated that Rebaldo's holding, that § 514
was limited by the requirement that a law must purport to regulate
ERISA plans, had been solidly and categorically refuted in IngersolRand. Id. at 1201-02 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Judge Nygaard found unpersuasive the example put forward in
Rebaldo that hospital surcharges do not differ from ordinary overhead costs. Id. The judge explained that Chapter 83 surcharges,
unlike normal utility costs, were not indirect costs associated with
general incidental hospital services, but were instead the "direct
costs of hospital services rendered to other patients, which have
been shifted to ERISA plans." Id. at 1202 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
The ultimate issue, the judge posited, was not whether ERISA plans
are entitled to nationally uniform hospital prices, because obviously this was impossible, but "whether state regulations have interfered with the operation of ERISA plans to the point where the
plans have suffered large financial losses." Id. According to Judge
Nygaard, there could be no doubt that ERISA plans had suffered
enormous financial losses due to Chapter 83, and this in itself
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should suffice to determine that Chapter 83 "related to" ERISA. Id.
at 1202.
After distinguishing the Chapter 83 system of deferred costs
from any market-based or regulated system by demonstrating that a
market-based or regulated system would pass losses to all customers, while Chapter 83 passed them solely and intentionally to ERISA plans, Judge Nygaard concluded by articulating the fear that
the majority decision would enable states to spend ERISA funds
freely provided they are clever enough to couch their statutes in
"generally applicable" terms. Id. at 1203 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
Such a result, the judge posited, while motivated by good intentions was nevertheless a clear violation of § 514(a) of ERISA when
viewed in any common sense fashion. Id.
Given that § 514(a) of ERISA contains one of the most expansive and notorious preemption clauses on record, the specificity
and exacting attention to detail given by the majority to determine
whether Chapter 83 "relates to" § 514 within the supposed "plain
meaning" of the term is confounding. While both the majority and
the dissent argue that congressional intent is the touchstone of any
preemption analysis, only Judge Nygaard, in dissent, gives the "relates to" issue the expansive and broad reading Congress no doubt
intended.
It is indeed puzzling that the State of New Jersey was willing to
concede, and the majority was willing to accept, that it would be
impossible for Chapter 83 to meet its social goals without ERISA
plan participation and yet refuse to acknowledge that Chapter 83
presupposed the existence of such plans or singled them out for
special treatment.
Equally disconcerting is the majority's argument that Chapter
83 in no way forced plan participants to restructure or conduct
their affairs in any way. That over forty plaintiffs joined in suit to
seek an injunction against Chapter 83 and paid monies only under
protest seems evidence enough that the plans were conducting
their affairs in an effort to avoid Chapter 83 costs.
It is doubtful that New Jersey did not have ERISA plans in
mind when drafting Chapter 83. As Judge Nygaard makes clear in
the dissent, the evidence is simply too overwhelming. More likely,
as Judge Nygaard suggests, New Jersey, wanting desperately to provide for its indigent citizens, but at no cost to itself, drafted Chapter 83 in terms of "general applicability" to avoid § 514
preemption.
The end result under Chapter 83 is that a number of needy
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people will be able to receive the hospital care they need at a cost
they can afford, and the State of New Jersey would not have to
spend a dime to achieve this result. No doubt the majority's opinion, as Judge Nygaard points out, has opened the flood gates for
any number of states who have, in the past, been placed between
the horns of a dilemma with ERISA preemption on one side and
the desire not to foot the bill for indigent care on the other. These
states can now seize the opportunity thatJudge Stapleton has given
them and rush to draft "generally applicable" statutes patterned
after NewJersey's Chapter 83. Some will say that the statutes which
are bound to follow the majority's decision are the result of socially
responsible adjudication, but others will question whether there
was ever meant to be such a thing.
ChristopherR. Carton

CIL PROCEDURE-SuBjEcr

MATTER JURISDICTION-OPINION
WRITTEN UPON WITHDRAWN OBJECTION MOOT AND THEREFORE

UNCONsTIrrTIONAL-State of New Jersey, Dep't of Envtl. Protection
& Energy v. HeldorIndus., Inc., 989 F.2d 702 (3d Cir.1993).
In State of New Jersey, Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection & Energy v. Heldor
Indus., Inc., the Department of Environmental Protection & Energy
(DEPE) objected to the terms of a proposed agreement in a bankruptcy proceeding concerning the allocation of proceeds from the
sale of Heldor's (debtor) assets. 989 F.2d at 704. DEPE contended
that the proposed settlement did not comply with NewJersey's Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act, New Jersey Statutes
Annotated section 13:1K-6 et seq. (ECRA). Subsequently, DEPE
withdrew its objection to the settlement agreement because
ECRA's goal had been achieved.
Although the bankruptcy judge was aware that DEPE had withdrawn its objection, he nevertheless issued an opinion approving
the settlement and overruling DEPE's objection to it. Id. at 704
(quoting In re Heldor Industries, Inc., 131 B.R. 578, 588 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1991)). The opinion asserted that parts of ECRA violated
the Supremacy Clause and the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. Accordingly, the judge held that those provisions
of ECRA were unconstitutional. Id.
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DEPE objected to this determination and requested that the
bankruptcy judge withdraw his opinion or vacate thejudgment. Id.
at 705. When the bankruptcy judge refused to withdraw the opinion, DEPE filed an appeal to the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey. Id. DEPE stated that the appeal was
from both the opinion of the bankruptcy court and the final order
denying the motion to vacate. Id. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court and held that DEPE's objection was not mooted
by its withdrawal. Id.
In a split decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the bankruptcy court was "constitutionally disabled" from writing an opinion and order based upon an objection that the bankruptcy judge knew had been withdrawn. Id. at 703.
Writing for the majority, Judge Dalzell first determined that
the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because
the appeal was from a final ruling of the district court affirming the
bankruptcy court decision. Id. at 705. The judge observed that
Congress had given the court "jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees" in bankruptcy cases. Id.
at n.2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)). Judge Dalzell posited that this
demonstrated Congress was more concerned with substance than
terminology. Id.
The court next reached the question of whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to write an opinion on a withdrawn
objection. Id. at 705-09. Judge Dalzell first looked to some basic
tenets of Article III jurisprudence. Id. at 705-06. The judge noted
that "Article III's reference to 'cases' and 'controversies' represents the first critical threshold to federal court jurisdiction." Id. at
706. The court noted that a case or controversy requires both antagonism and concreteness and emphasized that this requirement
disables federal courts from taking action in moot cases and from
rendering advisory opinions. Id. at 707. Judge Dalzell determined
that there was no case or controversy once DEPE withdrew its objection, and the judge concluded with the observation that the
bankruptcy court's opinion became "an answer to a question not
asked." Id.
The court next identified two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 707-08. First, the court explained that when an issue
becomes moot by "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct,"
the issue is still open for determination by the court. Id. at 707.
The court explained that this exception would be applicable if the
bankruptcy court had been called upon to decide the appropriate-
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ness of a DEPE regulation or procedure. Id. at 707-08. The majority determined, however, that because the question before the
court did not concern "a position of general regulatory significance that the agency could re-assert at will," this exception to the
mootness doctrine did not apply. Id. at 708.
The second exception, Judge Dalzell continued, applies when
an issue is capable of repetition but evades review. Id. (citing
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S.
498 (1911); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). In this situation,
Judge Dalzell declared, a court can issue an opinion if the challenged action will conclude before it can be fully litigated, and if
the same complaining party could reasonably expect to be exposed
to the same action in the future. Id. (citing Lewis v. Continental
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1975) (citations omitted)). In finding
that this exception also did not apply, the judge concluded that the
dispute between Heldor Industries and DEPE was finished and that
there was no chance that the same parties would be subject to the
same action again. Id.
Judge Dalzell concluded by observing that the power of federal courts has always been restricted to actual cases and controversies. Id. at 709. Accordingly, the majority reversed the district
court and held that because there was no "live controversy" for the
judge to decide, the opinion was advisory, and the judge was thus
constitutionally disabled from issuing an opinion. Id. at 708-09.
In a separate opinion, Judge Nygaard agreed that the controversy of DEPE's objection was mooted by the withdrawal of the decision. Id. at 709 (Nygaard, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge
Nygaard maintained, however, that just because the objection was
moot does not mean that the decision should have been vacated.
Id. The dissent argued that the opinion was dictum, contained no
holding, and was therefore not appealable. Id. at 709-10 (Nygaard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
Judge Nygaard first contended that there was indeed both a
"case" and a "controversy." Id. at 709 (Nygaard, J., concurring and
dissenting). The dissent asserted that the "case" was the bankruptcy matter before the bankruptcy court. Id. The "controversy",
the judge continued, was the approval by the bankruptcy court of
the settlement agreement. Id.
Judge Nygaard noted, however, that the issue of whether
DEPE's objection should be overruled was mooted by its withdrawal of the objection. Id. at 710 (Nygaard, J., concurring and
dissenting). The dissent agreed that the opinion should never
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have been issued, but nevertheless stated that the decision should
not have been vacated when the ruling did not adversely affect any
party. Id. Judge Nygaard noted that if a final decision, order, or
judgment is in a person's favor, "the court's sins, while not forgiven, are beyond review." Id. at 711 (Nygaard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
Next, Judge Nygaard contended that the order denying the
motion to vacate the opinion was not appealable. Id. at 710 (Nygaard, J., concurring and dissenting). The dissent insisted that the
fundamental basis for review is a final order, not an opinion. Id.
Appellate courts, the judge pointed out, do not have jurisdiction
to review reasoning not essential to the judgment. Id. (citations
omitted). For this reason, Judge Nygaard asserted that although
denial of the motion to vacate is an order and therefore looks appealable, it is really not so., Id. If this appeal were allowed, the
dissent argued, any person who receives a favorable ruling coming
from an opinion or finding with which that person disagrees could
request that the court vacate the opinion and then appeal the denial. Id. Determining that DEPE's appeal should have been dismissed, the dissent maintained that the majority's decision violated
well-established appellate jurisprudence that a party cannot appeal
unless the party is aggrieved by the judgment. Id.
The dissent concluded by observing that the bankruptcy court
had indeed written an opinion on a non-issue. Id. at 711 (Nygaard,
J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Nygaard further granted that
the lower court had breached a policy of the federal courts to refrain from answering a constitutional question unless absolutely
necessary. Id. Although Judge Nygaard also agreed that the opinion should not have been written, the judge emphasized that the
district court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the opinion of the bankruptcy court. Id.
As the court system becomes more crowded and controversies
increasingly complex, it becomes imperative for courts to uphold
the distinction between opinion and judgment. The dissent was
correct in categorizing the bankruptcy court's memorandum opinion as dicta. The sole holding of the bankruptcy court was that the
proposed bankruptcy settlement was approved. The determination of ECRA's constitutionality was not part of this holding. But
this determination was something the bankruptcy judge had spent
much time considering, and the judge felt constrained to share his
opinions. This is not necessarily bad, so long as it is recognized for
what it is, opinion.
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The majority noted that the Heldor opinion had been cited
with approval in at least four courts since September 6, 1991. Id. at
709. This, the court reasoned, is an indication that the decision
cannot be ignored as dictum and therefore must be vacated. Id.
What the majority does not say, however, is what part of the opinion is being cited and why. The bankruptcy court is not authority
for any other court. If another court is incorrectly relying on the
findings of the bankruptcy court to hold ECRA unconstitutional,
then this ruling would be appealable by DEPE. Instead of writing
an opinion that made clear that there were no legal precedents set
in Heldorand no holding that could be cited as precedent, the majority gave validity to the bankruptcy judge's opinion by declaring
the decision unconstitutional.
When the distinction between opinion and judgment is neglected the system becomes less precise. Judges put in expansive
statements that are excused because they are not part of the holding. Subsequently, these expansive statements are inaccurately
cited as authority and, if not prevented, become part of legal precedent through laxity. The courts have an obligation to uphold this
separation and ensure that the character and integrity of the court
system is not tarnished by imprecision. Dicta serves a useful purpose in our court system, but because it is dicta, it is imperative that
the courts maintain the highest standards in recognizing it for what
it is and not according dicta more significance than it merits.
Diane Schulze

LABOR LAW-BURDEN

PROOF
IN BLACK LUNG BENEFITS CASE IS PREPONDERANCE OF THE EviDENCE STAi.DARD- Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs United States Dep't of Labor, and
Andrew Ondecko, 990 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1993).
OF PROOF-CLAMrAr's BURDEN OF

Andrew Ondecko worked in the coal mining industry for approximately thirty-one years. 990 F.2d at 731. Ondecko worked for
Greenwich Collieries (Greenwich) for the last five to six of those
years, fixing and replacing underground pipe. In accordance with

the Black Lung Benefits Act (Act), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982),
Ondecko filed a benefits application with the United States Depart-
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ment of Labor (Department) claiming that pneumoconiosis, a
lung disease resulting from coal mine exposure, caused him total
disability and hindered his job performance. The Department responded to Ondecko's claim by denying benefits, ultimately finding that Ondecko was not disabled.
Subsequently, the administrative law judge (ALJ) granted
Ondecko's request for a hearing and reversed the Department's
decision. Id. at 731-32. The ALJ awarded Ondecko benefits utilizing the "true doubt" rule. Id. at 732. Although the ALJ found a
causal relationship between the claimant's mine employment and
his condition, the conflicting evidence and testimony as to causation was equally probative. Id. Therefore, the ALJ determined that
the "true doubt" of whether Ondecko suffered from the disease,
and whether it disabled him, had to be resolved in favor of
Ondecko. Id. at 731-32.
Greenwich appealed to the Benefits Review Board (Board)
and argued that any cases under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988), must comply with a
preponderance standard, thus precluding the utilization of the
true doubt rule. Id. at 731. Finding Greenwich's argument unmeritorious, the Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ. Id.
Greenwich subsequently petitioned the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to review the Board's decision. Id.
The court of appeals held that the use of the true doubt rule was
impermissible because it relieves the claimant from proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he in fact contracted pneumoconiosis from the coal mine. Id. The court further stated that the
preponderance standard is United States Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 737 (citing Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWOP, United
States Dept. of Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 141 (1987)). Therefore, the
court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further ALJ determination of whether Ondecko proved his entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
CircuitJudge Rosenn, writing for a unanimous court, acknowledged that a miner may receive disability benefits if (a) he or she is
completely disabled, (b) pneumoconiosis caused the disability, at
least in part, and (c) the disability resulted from coal mine employment. Id. at 732 (citing Mullins, 484 U.S. at 141). The court continued that if the claimant worked in coal mines for a minimum of
ten years and met one of four medical requirements, such as a
chest X-ray which confirms pneumoconiosis, the three conditions
are presumed. Id. Observing the ALJ's use of the true doubt rule,
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the circuit judge stated that the rule, adopted by many courts, is
used as a tool to evaluate evidence as a whole on the record. Id.
The court articulated that the basis for the rule is to promote compensatory statutes which allow indemnity in faultless injury cases at
the workplace, the liberal interpretation of which should benefit
the claimant. Id. The court opined that the true doubt rule provides the courts with a convenient method of placing the risk of
nonpersuasion on the employer who is most able to bear such a
risk. Id.
Judge Rosenn next observed that the ALJ utilized the first basis under the Act, requiring the claimant to prove existing pneumoconiosis with an X-ray, to establish the causative link to the coal
mine. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.202(a) (1), 718.102). The judge
stated, however, that United States Supreme Court precedent
made application of the true doubt rule improper because such an
X-ray must show existence of pneumoconiosis by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id. at 733 (citing Mullins Coal Co., 484 U.S. at
141). Mere evidence of pneumoconiosis, the court declared, did
not rise to the level of preponderance. Id.
Judge Rosenn added that preponderance of the evidence is
defined as evidence which weighs more heavily than the contravening evidence and which establishes that it is more probable than
not that a certain fact exists. Id. (citation omitted). The circuit
judge noted that medical experts in the case did not agree on
whether the claimant's X-ray revealed the presence of pneumoconiosis. Id. Use of the true doubt rule by the ALJ did not prove the
alleged pneumoconiosis by the acceptable preponderance of the
evidence standard, but rather, the court observed, merely established an evidentiary balance as to the presence of the disease. Id.
Accordingly, the court articulated that the finding by the ALJ in
favor of Ondecko was inconsistent with the preponderance of the
evidence standard proffered by Mullins. Id.
After recognizing that Mullins precludes the utilization of the
true doubt rule to find the existence of pneumoconiosis under 20
C.F.R. § 718.202(a) (1), the court enumerated three reasons why
use of the true doubt rule is improper, whether or not a presumption is involved. Id. at 733. The court first set forth that the ultimate burden of persuasion is carried by the claimant. Id. The
court explained that if the claimant fails to meet his burden of persuasion, the fact finder must find against him. Id. at 733-34. This
fundamental principle, the judge continued, is located in § 718 as
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well as United States Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 734 (citing
20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1992)).
Circuit Judge Rosenn acknowledged Ondecko's claim that
§ 718 and the United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting
APA section 7(c) both determine that the claimant merely has the
burden of setting forth the evidence, and that it is the employer
who has the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing N.L.R.B. v. Transp. Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(1983)). The court, however, dismissed Ondecko's argument as
having confused the varied meanings of the phrase "burden of
proof" as used in the Court's interpretation of APA section 7(c).
Id. According to Circuit Judge Rosenn, use of the verb "prove" in
§ 718 is not subject to the same variations as the "burden of proof'
phrase. Id. The court explained that when a party is required to
prove a certain fact or issue, he or she also carries the burden of
persuasion because "to prove" means establishing a fact as certain
by supporting evidence. Id. (citation omitted). The circuit judge
further clarified that the burden of production requires a party to
come forward with evidence bearing on the ultimate issue and that
the burden of persuasion requires a party to prove the facts to
meet the appropriate standard. Id. at 735.
The court asserted that § 718.403 does not encompass the
phrase "burden of proof." Rather, the court continued, the section
specifies that the claimant has the burden of proving an alleged
fact. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1992)). Therefore, the circuit
judge emphasized, § 718 requires the claimant to prove pneumoconiosis, with the word "prove" indicating that the claimant has to
factually show the disease's presence, accordingly placing the burden of persuasion on the claimant. Id. at 735.
The court next acknowledged the Act's humanitarian purposes by recognizing that Congress created a presumption of the
presence of pneumoconiosis, that the pneumoconiosis resulted
from coal mine employment, and that it caused total disability
when a claimant met certain criteria. Id. Circuit Judge Rosenn,
however, maintained that a miner must actually suffer from pneumoconiosis because presumption of entitlement would otherwise
be improper. Id. (citing Mullins, 484 U.S. at 158).
The second reason why usage of the true doubt rule was improper, the court stated, is because the APA and the United States
Supreme Court designated the burden of persuasion to be by a
preponderance of the evidence standard in Black Lung Benefits
Act cases. Id. Furthermore, the court continued, APA section 7(c)
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requires that the party who stands to benefit from a rule or order
bears the burden of proof, unless a statute otherwise specifies. Id.
at 736 (citation omitted).
The third reason for the impropriety of the true doubt rule is
that the rule, the court determined, allows for an unjust ruling in
favor of a claimant who fails to meet the burden of persuasion
under a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. The court
attested that a fact is proven when a party demonstrates that a fact's
existence is more probable than not. Id. The circuit judge distinguished the preponderance of the evidence standard from the true
doubt rule which applies only when the evidence is in equipoise.
Id. The court opined that when a claimant fails to carry his ultimate burden of persuasion, the true doubt rule abrogates the preponderance of the evidence standard by effectively allowing a
ruling in favor of the claimant. Id.
The court went on to address an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stating that the true doubt rule relaxes
the preponderance of the evidence standard in many civil suits. Id.
(citing Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Kennel, 914 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.

1990)). Circuit Judge Rosenn emphasized, however, that the true
doubt moderation of a claimant's burden of proof is not allowed by
the APA. Id. at 736. According to the circuit judge, application of
the true doubt rule in cases which fall under the Act is precluded
by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the APA in
Mullins. Id. The court posited that it was unclear whether the ALJ
decided if the claimant met the preponderance of the evidence
standard. Id. at 737. Accordingly, the court vacated the judge's
order and remanded the case for further determination. Id. The
court concluded that if the ALJ finds the evidence equal in weight
for both parties, the order must be in favor of Greenwich and
against Ondecko for not reaching his burden of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
In Greenwich Collieries, the Third Circuit clarified a discrepancy
between the Supreme Court of the United States, statutory law,
and the finding of the ALJ. The court correctly demonstrated the
importance of the preponderance of the evidence standard as a
part of the burden of persuasion. The true doubt rule, with good
intention, protects claimants in a society that often treats them
harshly. Failure to allow application of the true doubt rule, however, did not bring about an unjust result, but rather, it prevented
one. Although a preference for a liberal interpretation in favor of
the claimant appears well intentioned, it is not the function of the
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courts to rewrite legislation to allow for such leniency. The fact
finder cannot rely on the claimant's word alone, nor evidence
which merely counterpoises the employer's evidence against the
claim. Modification of the underlying principles of the claimant's
ultimate burden of persuasion makes an unfortunate mockery of
the solidity of that claimant's case and opens the door to false and
unjust claims against employers. The Greenwich Collieries decision
successfully maintains the civil burden of proof standard for cases
under the Black Lung Benefits Act and does not recreate a rule of
law which already ensures equal justice to both parties.
Rebecca Smith

LABOR LAW-ARBrrRATION AwARDs-AN ARBITRATION AwARD
REINSTATING HELMSMAN WHO TESTED POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA
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v.
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AGAINST THE OPERATION OF SEA VESSELS BY DRUG

1993).
On April 7, 1989, Morris Foster was employed as the helmsman of the 635-foot Exxon Wilmington, an oil tanker navigating the
Mississippi River in Louisiana. 993 F.2d at 358. On that day, the
ship ran aground, and, pursuant to both Exxon Shipping Company's (Exxon) Alcohol and Drug Use Policy (drug policy), and
Coast Guard regulations, the helmsman, captain, and pilot were all
tested for alcohol and drug use. Because Exxon used a stricter
screening level than the Coast Guard, both agencies employed separate tests. Helmsman Foster tested negative for marijuana use at
the Coast Guard's initial screening, but received a positive result
from Exxon. After a confirmatory test yielded a second positive
result, Exxon found Foster in violation of their drug policy and
fired him. Id. at 358-59.
Exxon Seamen's Union (Union) filed a grievance in protest of
Foster's termination which was later submitted to arbitration. Id.
at 359. On March 13, 1991, the arbitration board found that
although Foster had breached Exxon's drug policy, Exxon's termination penalty was too severe. Thus, the arbitration award directed
Exxon to reinstate Foster, withhold back pay, and subject him to a
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one-year program of random drug testing. In support of a less severe penalty, the board cited the lack of evidence of Foster's drug
use or impairment while on the ship, his negative result from the
Coast Guard test, Exxon's low screening level, and that discharge
would not be consistent with the preventive and rehabilitative goals
of Exxon's policy. Id. at 359-60.
Claiming that the arbitration award violated public policy, Exxon brought an action to vacate the award in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. Id. at 360. The district
court, empowered with jurisdiction under the Labor Management
Relations Act, granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment,
identifying an important public policy against the operation of
commercial vessels by drug users. Id. Holding that the award violated this policy, the district court emphasized that Foster's reinstatement would undermine Exxon's drug policy, condone the
operation of vessels by drug users, and would not deter drug use by
individuals performing similar safety-sensitive jobs. Id. In conclusion, the district court pointed out that the award did not require
drug rehabilitation for Foster, nor did he request it, creating a
doubt as to whether he would remain drug-free. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, exercising its plenary review powers, examined the district court's grant of
summary judgment. Id. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge
Scirica first explained that the Third Circuit would apply the same
standard that the district court should have utilized in its initial
review of the arbitration award. Id. The court articulated that this
standard is narrow, indicating a partiality for the speed, finality,
and flexibility of federal labor law arbitration. Id. (citing Penntech
Papers, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 896 F.2d 51, 53 (3d
Cir. 1990)). Judge Scirica declared that unless an arbitration
award is given in total disregard of the collective bargaining agreement or the record is devoid of support for the determination, it
will generally be upheld. Id. (citing News Am. Publicationsv. Newark
Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)). An
exception to this general rule, the judge proffered, enables the circuit court to vacate an award which violates an existing and controlling public policy. Id. (citing WR. Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)). This
public policy, the judge explained, must be based upon an interpretation of legal precedents and cannot be formulated by questioning the arbitrator's fact-finding. Id. (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit then examined the source and identity of
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the public policy at issue. Id. In finding such a policy embodied in
the Coast Guard regulations which Foster breached, Judge Scirica
noted that the Coast Guard's overriding concern is the safe operation of vessels. Id. at 360-61. Disposing of the parties' argument
over whether the drug use by Foster occurred on or off-duty, the
judge reasoned that this distinction is of secondary importance to
the safety issues involved. Id. at 361.
The judge further elucidated that the Coast Guard regulations
provide for the dismissal or removal from duties of any individual
who tests positive for drugs. Id. (citing 46 C.F.R. § 16.201 (c)). Additionally, Judge Scirica explained that in order regain employment, the regulations require employees to prove to a medical
review officer that they are drug-free and a low-risk for subsequent
drug use. Id. (citing 46 C.F.R. § 16.370(d)). The Third Circuit
recognized that these severe sanctions illustrate the Coast Guard's
cognizance that the operation of ships by drug- impaired individuals poses extreme safety risks. Id.
Finding that a drug-free work environment in safety-sensitive
areas is a fundamental government interest, the court stressed that
other jurisdictions have frequently addressed this concern. Id. (citing Tramp. Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648, 654
(D.D.C. 1989)). In further support of Exxon's public policy argument, Judge Scirica highlighted Congress's statute authorizing the
Coast Guard regulations. Id. The judge focused on the statute's
provision for the license revocation of a merchant mariner who
tested positive for drugs, unless that individual conclusively proved
his successful rehabilitation. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 7704(c),
7503(b) (2)). Although recognizing that Foster passed the Coast
Guard test, the court nonetheless found this provision influential
because drug use was conclusively established. Id.
The Third Circuit next recognized that the Coast Guard's regulations are part of a broad scheme by Congress to prevent operation of common carriers by drug and alcohol abusers. Id. Judge
Scirica acknowledged that the Federal Aviation Administration,
Federal Railroad Administration, and Federal Highway Administration all utilize similar drug testing programs in an effort to uphold
the government's public policy interest in safety. Id. at 361-62 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the judge commented that the
safety interests of the railroad industry are virtually indistinguishable from those of the Coast Guard. Id. at 362 (citing Transportation Inst., 727 F. Supp. at 654).
In further support of the importance of this public policy, the
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Third Circuit pointed out that other courts confronted with challenges to similar arbitration awards have also focused on the importance of public safety issues. Id. To support its position, the
court noted an Eleventh Circuit decision denying reinstatement of
a pilot who flew a passenger plane while under the influence of
alcohol. Id. (citing Delta Airlines Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int' 861
F.2d 665, 673 (11th Cir. 1988)). In this and other similar cases, the
court promulgated, the lives of the passengers, crew, and the general public are of paramount importance. Id. (citations omitted).
Congress's creation of the Coast Guard agency, Judge Scirica continued, is further evidence of the importance of the public policy
ensuring safety on public waters. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 2103,
2104 (1988)). The Third Circuit concluded that the Coast Guard
regulations identified a dominant public policy against the operation of carriers by those influenced by drugs or alcohol. Id.
Judge Scirica next addressed the question of whether the arbitration award reinstating helmsman Foster violated this public policy and declared that courts have been in disagreement over the
proper standard of review in such cases. Id. at 362-63. The court
stated that one approach has been to find an award violative of a
public policy only if reinstatement would violate a rule prohibiting
reinstatement. Id. at 363 (citing American Postal Worker's Union v.
United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). A more
expansive approach, the circuit judge declared, has been to vacate
awards that are "inconsistent with some significant public policy."
Id. (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. GrasselliEmp. Ass'n., 790 F.2d
611, 616 (7th Cir. 1986)). The Third Circuit found that this
broader public policy test, followed by the First, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits, was the most viable approach. Id. (citations
omitted).
Using this standard, the Third Circuit concluded that the arbitration award reinstating Foster violated a dominant public policy
of environmental protection and public safety. Id. at 364. Additionally, the court continued, the award was inconsistent with the
Coast Guard public policy of discouraging drug use by commercial

vessel operators and promoting maritime safety. Id. The court further asserted that a positive drug test under Coast Guard guidelines warranted dismissal and conditioned reinstatement on a

drug-free certification and sixty months of random drug testing.
Id. Judge Scirica argued, however, that the arbitration award ignored this explicit condition of rehabilitation by only issuing twelve
months of random drug testing upon Foster's reinstatement. Id.
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Finally, the circuit judge concluded that the award would not only
be inconsistent with public policy in the shipping industry, but in
all fields where operators of common carriers are discharged for
drug use. Id. (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit next addressed the Union's claim that the
district court's ruling centered on Foster's past drug use and did
not conclusively establish that the arbitration award itself violated
public policy. Id. at 364-65. The court rejected the Union's argument and reiterated the district court's discontent with the absence
of evidence that Foster would remain drug-free in the future. Id.
Judge Scirica noted that the district court was especially disturbed
that the arbitrator did not require rehabilitation for Foster's reinstatement, especially because the Coast Guard required up to five
years of future random drug testing. Id. at 365 (citing 46 C.F.R.
§ 16.370(d)). This evidence, the judge maintained, provided support for the district court's ruling, which did not focus solely on
the employee's past conduct but rather was indicative of the future
goals inherent in the Coast Guard's drug policies. Id. at 366.
Judge Scirica also rejected the Union's contention that the
Coast Guard's inaction in the matter provided support for upholding the arbitrator's award. Id. In similar cases where such federal
agency action or inaction is mentioned, the circuit judge reasoned,
the agency's involvement is only one of a group of factors to be
analyzed in determining if an award is violative of public policy. Id.
(citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court stated its belief that
Foster's termination comported with public policy despite the fact
that Foster tested negative at the Coast Guard's initial screening
level. Id. Coast Guard regulations, the judge maintained, do not
preclude companies, such as Exxon, from imposing lower drug
testing levels. Id. (citing 46 C.F.R. § 16.10(b)). Instead, the court
pointed out, the Coast Guard guidelines merely prescribe the minimum levels to be employed. Id. Finally, the Third Circuit underscored the arbitration board's finding that Exxon's testing
standards were not unreasonable, and pointed out that Foster still
tested dangerously close to the Coast Guard's cut-off level. Id.
In recognizing that the Coast Guard regulations enabled Exxon to discharge Foster from all duties which may affect the ship's
safety, the judge acknowledged the Union's argument that the
award did not require that he be reinstated in such a safety-sensitive position. Id. at 366-67. Judge Scirica, however, dismissed this
contention by restating the appropriate language of the award,
namely that Foster be restored to his former position, a helmsman
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responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel. Id. at 367. The
court further proffered that the case is sub judice distinguishable
from United Papenrorkers Int'l Union v. Misco, a Supreme Court decision which upheld an award reinstating an employee to either his
former position or another for which he was qualified. Id. (citing
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 45 (1988)). In
contrast, the Third Circuit reasoned, Foster was qualified only as a
helmsman, and reinstatement would violate the public policy
against having drug users perform safety-sensitive tasks. Id.
After concluding that the award violated public policy and explicitly delineating the court's reasoning, Judge Scirica submitted
that environmental and safety concerns were prevalent in reaching
this decision. Id. In determining that this case had more serious
implications than similar arbitration award disputes, the judge reiterated that a federal regulatory agency was empowered by Congress to govern this field, expressing the seriousness of the
government's efforts to promote public safety. Id. at 367-68. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment. Id. at 368.
The Third Circuit wisely vacated the arbitrator's award reinstating Morris Foster. From an environmental standpoint, it is crucial that an oil tanker be navigated by responsible and efficient
operators. Reinstating a proven drug user would greatly undermine this policy and would not deter other employees in similar
safety-sensitive positions from using drugs or alcohol while on the
job. In light of the Exxon Valdez disaster, shipping companies
should be applauded and not scrutinized for their strict drug
screening policies, and Exxon should not be hindered in its efforts
to promote maritime safety.
Thomas E. Claps
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SPEECH AND INVOLUNTARY SERVI-

TUDE-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION REQUIREMENT OF COMMUNITy

SERVICE

DOES

NOT

VioLATE

FIRST

OR

FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH EVEN THOUGH EXPRESSIONS OF ALTRUISM MAY BE OBVIOUS TO OBSERVERS, NOR DOES
REQUIREMENT VIOLATE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION

AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE EVEN IF THE STUDENTS ARE

NOT COMPENSATED-Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d

989 (3d Cir. 1993).
In an attempt to instill a sense of pride and civic responsibility,
the Bethlehem Area School District mandated that graduating seniors, except special education students, perform at least sixty
hours of community service. 987 F.2d at 991. For its initiative, the
school district and its superintendent were sued. Id. at 992. The
parents of several children enrolled in the school maintained that
the program violated the students' First Amendment right to free
speech because it compelled the students to adopt the altruistic
sentiments of the school board even when the students might not
have wished to express such a viewpoint. Id. at 993. The plaintiffs
further argued that forcing the students to work without pay was
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 997.
Upon finding that community service was "non-expressive conduct," the district court held that there was no violation of the First
Amendment. Id. at 993. The lower court also considered whether
the community service requirement was akin to involuntary servitude and thus prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at
998. Premising its decision on Bobilin v. Bd. of Educ., 403 F. Supp.
1095 (D. Haw. 1975), the court verified the program's conformance with constitutional standards so long as the service resulted in
a public benefit. Steirer, 987 F.2d at 998. The district court accordingly rejected both of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges and
granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment. Id. at
992.
Utilizing a different analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ultimately reached the same determination as the lower court. Id. at 1000. The court first asserted that
this program did not force the students to express themselves
where the First Amendment otherwise ensured their right to remain silent. Id. at 997. Additionally, the court advanced that the
program was not analogous to slavery and so did not fall within the
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Thirteenth Amendment proscription. Id. at 1000. Accordingly,
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. Id.
Judge Sloviter, writing for the court, initially discussed United
States Supreme Court decisions underscoring a person's right to
abstain from participation in particular expressions of politics, nationalism, religion, or any ideological message. 1d.at 993 (quoting
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977)). The court, however,
rejected plaintiffs' argument that simply because school board
members had expressed their appreciation of the value of community service, the high school students were, by their mere involvement in the program, adopting this "philosophy of altruism." Id.
Citing no authority for its position, the court justified its conclusion by remarking that other requirements, such as studying, writing papers, and taking exams, were not constitutionally forbidden.
Id.
The court next relied on Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968) for the proposition that a school course demonstrating certain ideologies did not necessarily impinge on First Amendment
values. Id. at 994. Nonetheless, Judge Sloviter was careful to establish that educational programs were still subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Id. According to the court, a violation would occur when
"instead of merely teaching, the educators demand that students
express agreement with the educators' values." Id. The court thus
acknowledged the potential of the present issue to implicate constitutional concerns, but found no requirement here that a student
manifest any particular expression, namely the merit of community
service. Id. at 996. Instead, the court pointed to evidence clearly
showing that students were, in fact, offered a variety of organizations from which to choose so that they were not compelled to support a philosophy in opposition to their own. Id.
Refusing to restrict the holding to traditional speech, the
court expanded its application to other expressive conduct. Id. at
994 (citations omitted). At the same time, however, the court
noted certain Supreme Court rulings defining the limits of what
constituted "speech" for purposes of First Amendment protection.
Id. at 995-96 (citations omitted). Judge Sloviter further observed a
trend in recent Supreme Court and federal decisions narrowing
the scope of First Amendment protection, particularly in a school
milieu. Id. at 996 (citations omitted). Citing several cases where
the protected activity encompassed "an obviously expressive element," the court summarily declared that the act of community
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service did not possess such an element and was therefore unprotected. Id. at 994-95 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 795-801 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 713-15; Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974)).
Positing that the conduct must be viewed in its "factual context and environment in which it is undertaken," the court next
examined instances where expression was deemed constitutionally
protected when the act was viewed from the observer's perspective.
Id. at 995 (citations omitted). Judge Sloviter nevertheless disagreed with plaintiffs' contention that observers would necessarily
view the students' behavior as a statement of their recognition of
the relative importance of community service or altruism. Id. at
997. Rather, the court hypothesized that observers would merely
consider the students' participation in the program as yet another
graduation requirement. Id.
Emphasizing the importance of minimal judicial oversight in
the school system, the court alternatively encouraged the exercise
of great latitude to allow the local governing authorities to conduct
the system's operation as they saw fit. Id. at 993-94 (citing Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)). Further, Judge Sloviter
generalized that, historically, the function of schools has been to
instill community values. Id. at 997. Finding that the program did
not "directly and sharply implicate constitutional values," the
court, in concluding its First Amendment discussion, insisted that
there was no reason to interfere with the school's decision to implement this requirement that differed only marginally from other
school courses. Id.
The court next deliberated on whether the program consisted
of "involuntary servitude" as prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 997-98. As a threshold matter, the court refused to
accept plaintiffs' "dissection" of the phrase "involuntary servitude."
Id. at 998. Instead, the court adopted the contextual interpretation
of this phrase set forth in United States v. Kozminski, which took into
account the situation as a whole. Id. (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988); Butler v. Peny, 240 U.S. 328, 332
(1916)). The court rejected plaintiffs' proposition that the
school's withholding of the diploma made the completion of this
program mandatory and thus involuntary. Id. The court also repudiated plaintiffs' argument that because this program did not provide for any compensation to the students, it necessarily
constituted servitude. Id.
Although the district court had relied on Bobilin's holding that
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the school program escaped constitutional scrutiny merely because
it allowed for a public benefit, the court of appeals utilized a different analysis to reach the same conclusion. Id. at 998-99. In so doing, the court affirmed the proposition that forced labor was
prohibited only in the limited situations where there was either
physical or legal coercion. Id. (citing Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 943).
The court then asserted that what is currently regarded as constituting involuntary servitude has been "limited to labor camps, isolated religious sects, or forced confinement." Id. at 999 (citations
omitted). Judge Sloviter also cited cases where involuntary servitude outside this narrow context was simply not recognized. Id.
(citations omitted). The court further discussed situations in which
the government could constitutionally require its citizens to perform certain duties under threat of penalty for nonperformance.
Id. at 999 (citations omitted). Finally, the court enunciated that
there was no compulsion where the individual had, however unappealing, "alternatives to performing the labor." Id. at 1000.
In conclusion, Judge Sloviter contended that the school program was not comparable to the slavery against which the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to protect. Id. Instead, the court
ruled that the program was there to benefit the students performing the service. Id. Despite the fact that these students would not
receive compensation, the court found no basis for a Thirteenth
Amendment violation. Id. Accordingly, because the court discovered no constitutional infractions, it affirmed the lower court's decision granting summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
Regardless of whether this case was one of first impression, see
id. at 992 ("w]e are aware of no federal appellate court decision
addressing the constitutionality of such a program in public
school"), the Third Circuit's judgment will hopefully create a lasting impression upon those for whom it was ultimately decidedthe students. Ironically, the special beneficiaries of this holding
were addressed briefly, if at all. Instead, the court observed only in
passing that the program was "designed for the students' own benefit and education." Id. at 1000. In fact, it was the students, not the
organizations, who would be the likely recipients of the rewards
from their own exertions.
It is mystifying that neither court recognized the validity of
defendant's argument that the students' service was constitutionally prohibited only if it was performed "for another's benefit,
which is the essence of involuntary servitude." Steirer v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 987 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing Bai-
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ley v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)). Had the court found that
it was the students and not the organizations who were truly gaining something of value, the court could have easily dispensed with
plaintiffs' entire argument that the students were in servitude because they were not being compensated.
Further, this court, instead of completely rebuffing the district
court's reliance on Bobilin, could have used Bobilin as an illustration
of the great contrast between it and the present case. Bobilin was
decided on the premise that even cafeteria duty could "indicate the
presence of an educational plan which legitimizes the educational
nature and quality [of the cafeteria duty]." Bobilin, 403 F. Supp. at
1098 n.6. Thus, the court could have unabashedly analogized that
the community service program manifested the presence of an
even greater educational purpose, as defendants had stated that it
served "seventeen separate educational goals." Steirer, 789 F. Supp.
at 1343.
Most importantly, the court could, and perhaps should, have
used this opportunity to address the issues presented on public policy grounds. The court could have applauded the defendant's efforts to teach the value and necessity of doing for others without
receiving monetary or other tangible reward, thus fostering a sense
of individual and communal pride and responsibility. For unexplained reasons, unfortunately, the court chose not to do so.
Cheryl Aptowitzer

